This paper provides the …rst empirical analysis directly comparing the e¤ects of customs unions (CUs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) on members' bilateral trade, while addressing the biases arising from log-linearization of the gravity model and crucial time-invariant unobservables. Since Fiorentino et al. (2007) question the popularity of CUs relative to FTAs, considering the latter to be more practical in the current trading climate, such a comparison seems especially relevant. While …nd an FTA to approximately double members'bilateral trade after 10 years, the results of this paper …nd CUs to have had a much larger impact than FTAs.
Introduction
In today's trading climate, the relevance of analyzing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) cannot Any PTA is essentially an arrangement among countries whereby members engage in trade at reduced tari¤ rates. Such bene…ts are typically not extended to non-members and are usually accompanied by a dismantling of quantitative restrictions as well (Krueger 1999 ). The arrangements may be partial or total with respect to the extent of duty reduction or commodity coverage. 2 Non-partial or total agreements can be further classi…ed into two categories. If the members eliminate tari¤s internally while maintaining their individual external tari¤s, a free trade area or free trade agreement (FTA) is formed. In case they also unify their external tari¤s, the arrangement is termed a customs union (CU). It is this common external tari¤ (CET) which separates a CU from an FTA. Another important distinction between the two, which follows from the CET, is the extent of the role of rules of origin (ROO). In either preferential regime, the ROO are restrictions on the preferential treatment of goods which are not produced or signi…cantly transformed by a member country. 3 However, they have greater relevance, in the context of FTAs, due to an additional implication. 4 In case of an FTA, a CET is absent. This potentially allows a good to enter the free trade zone as an export to the member with the minimum duty for it. The ROO, in an FTA, prevent tari¤ concessions on the subsequent exports of these goods to the other members. Prominent FTAs include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), whereas the Mercosur comprises an the latter to be characterized by liberalization across "most major sectors" and covering a "high percentage of total trade." 3 Bhagwati et al. (1999, p. 543) provide an account of the alternative criteria used in de…ning ROO. Krishna (2005) is also an excellent survey. 4 Krueger (1997, p. 177) considers that ROO "can act as additional trade barriers under an FTA in ways that they cannot do under a customs union." Krishna (2005) is of a similar opinion as well.
example of a CU. 5 The literature on preferential agreements, dating back to at least as early as Viner (1950) , has addressed a host of associated policy issues. Unfortunately, analyses pertaining to a comparison of the types of PTAs have received relatively less attention. Perhaps Krueger (1997, p . 171) best expresses this, stating: "Surprisingly ... there has been little analysis of di¤erent types of preferential arrangements, and in particular, of free trade agreements in contrast to customs unions. "Clausing (2000) , the only contribution to the author's knowledge after Krueger (1997) in terms of directly comparing FTAs and CUs, also alludes to this lack of attention. However, both Krueger (1997) and Clausing (2000) are theoretical contributions. While Krueger (1997) …nds a CU to be Paretosuperior to an FTA, Clausing (2000, p. 418) "generates speci…c conditions that determine when customs unions are preferred to free trade areas."Accordingly, the empirical literature seems to be even more lacking in this respect. 6 This paper …lls the gap by analyzing a straightforward question:
do countries belonging to a CU engage in more bilateral trade (in goods) on average than countries belonging to an FTA? One may also go further up the scale of integration and consider a common market, which allows for free movement of factors of production as well. However, a common market is essentially an arrangement where countries form a CU before permitting any increased mobility of the factors (Krueger 1997) . Accordingly, such regimes of further integration (e.g. the European Union) are treated as CUs in this paper. 6 Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) and Magee (2008) are empirical contributions, which allow for di¤erential e¤ects of the degree of integration, but both analyses primarily allude to the trade creation and trade diversion issue. 7 CUs and partial scope agreements constitute 8% each. More generally, members of a CU are found to engage in signi…cantly greater volumes of bilateral trade than FTA members. Strikingly, the ranking remains unaltered when membership to the European Union (EU) is additionally controlled for, or an interesting split of the sample is considered. Although the initial success of CUs can be partly attributed to the EU, the latter's prominence disappears following the emergence of more recent CUs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical methodology. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents the results, while Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Methodology

Cross Section Analysis
Gravity models are estimated using the PPML estimator and OLS to compare the e¤ects of FTAs and CUs. The speci…cation for the PPML method is given by
Here, T ij is the nominal value of exports from country i to country j; D ij is the distance between i and j; lang ij is a dummy variable taking the value one if i and j share a common language (zero otherwise); adj ij is a binary variable assuming the value unity if i and j share a land border (zero otherwise); F T A ij (CU ij ) is a dummy variable taking the value one if i and j are part of an FTA (CU) and zero otherwise; and i and j are country-speci…c dummies. 8 Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that (1) may be estimated using an estimator that is numerically equivalent to the PPML estimator, provided
The OLS speci…cation is instead given by
Consistent estimation of (3) requires
However, as noted by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), (2) does not imply (4) (invoking Jensen's inequality); in fact, the OLS elasticity estimates may be biased if the PPML speci…cation su¤ers from heteroskedasticity. Henderson and Millimet (2008) …nd this concern relevant and recommend estimating the gravity model using the PPML. This also avoids the omission of observations with zero trade ‡ows or the use of other ad hoc measures to address it.
Panel Analysis
The cross-section estimates are likely to be biased due to endogenous trade agreements. An excellent account of the endogeneity issue, and the failure of previous cross-section studies to address it, can be found in Baier and Bergstrand (2007, p. 78) , who consider an omitted variable or selection bias to be "the major source" of the endogeneity. Although Magee (2003) attempts to address it by relying on instrumental variables (IV), the quality of the instruments used is clearly suspect. It is unlikely that variables like GDP similarities or di¤erences in relative factor endowments between two countries are uncorrelated with unobservables a¤ecting the volume of trade between them. For any two countries, the di¢ culty of coming up with an instrument which is correlated with their likelihood of forming a trade agreement, but uncorrelated with such pairwise unobservables compels 8 The country dummies are usually used to control for country-speci…c unobservables that do not vary across trading partners as well as the multilateral resistance terms (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003) . In this case, they also capture the impact of GDP. Henderson and Millimet (2008) , the panel analysis is mainly conducted using the PPML speci…cation which is given by
In this case, T ijt is the real value of exports from country i to country j at time t. While distance, language, and adjacency drop out of (5), being captured by the panel …xed e¤ects, the other variables have an additional t subscript. Accordingly, F T A ijt (CU ijt ) takes the value one if i and j are part of an FTA (CU) at time t and zero otherwise; and it and jt are the country-by-time dummies.
The unobservable term is decomposed into time-varying and time-invariant components such that ijt = ijt ij : The panel …xed e¤ects method provides consistent estimates even in the presence of any correlation between the time-invariant unobservables ij and the trade agreement dummies.
While trade agreements usually have a phase-in period, some of the e¤ects may actually precede the date of the agreement. Hence, some of the panel speci…cations include lag and lead terms of the trade agreement dummies to capture any lagged or anticipatory e¤ects. Baier and Bergstrand 9 The method also addresses the issue of measurement error in the time-invariant regressors, such as distance.
(2007, p. 90) also recommend the inclusion of lag terms since trade agreements involve changes in countries'terms of trade, which "tend to have lagged e¤ects on trade volumes."In other words, some panel speci…cations include variables like F T A ij;t k and CU ij;t k or, F T A ij;t+k and CU ij;t+k : The variable F T A ij;t k (CU ij;t k ) is simply the k th lag of F T A ijt (CU ijt ) and captures the lagged e¤ects of the FTA (CU). Similarly, the variable F T A ij;t+k (CU ij;t+k ) is the k th lead of F T A ijt (CU ijt ) and captures any anticipatory e¤ect. 10 
Data
The data come from Baier and Bergstrand (2007) In keeping with the original data, the classi…cation of trade agreements into the two PTA types is based on the sources listed in Table 3 in . For further clarity, Table   A1 , in the appendix, lists the FTAs and CUs considered along with the relevant years. In addition, the trade agreement dummy in the original data involved errors, which have been corrected. All such corrections, and the exact sources on which they are based, …nd mention in the table footnotes. Tables 1, 2 Table 1 reports results using the OLS speci…cation excluding observations with zero bilateral trade, 10 Note, in this context, the inclusion of lags and leads should not be viewed as a test of strict exogeneity. Instead, these variables are included in the model to capture the dynamics associated with the implementation of FTAs and CUs. Tables 1 and 2 , the coe¢ cient on CU is more negative than the FTA coe¢ cient.
Results
Cross Section Results
Results from the PPML speci…cation are strikingly di¤erent. The statistically signi…cant coef…cients on FTA and CU are all positive. The p-values, in Tables 1,   2 and 3 are consistent with this too. Thus, regardless of the endogeneity due to omitted variables, the potential endogeneity arising from the OLS speci…cation seems to be of signi…cant relevance by itself. In fact, the potential bias from using OLS is large enough to render the positive and significant PPML coe¢ cient estimates insigni…cant, or even negative and signi…cant. The cross-section …ndings further support PPML estimation. Accordingly, the PPML method is adopted for the 11 use the OLS speci…cation and omit observations with zero trade. Accordingly, the column (a) estimates of Table 1 are very similar to their cross-section estimates. Very slight di¤erences arise due to their imposition of unit income elasticities.
panel …xed e¤ects method.
Panel Results
Unlike the cross-section estimates, the panel results, reported in Table 4 Across all speci…cations, the coe¢ cients on CU are positive and signi…cantly greater than the FTA coe¢ cients. Individual and joint tests reject the equality of the coe¢ cients on FTA and CU, and on their lag and lead terms, at the 1% level.
Column (a) indicates that an FTA increases members' bilateral trade by less than 17%, on average, relative to countries not belonging to a CU or an FTA. 13 However, a CU increases the same by about 77%. The di¤erence seems to be even more stark once the lagged and anticipatory e¤ects Tables 1 and 5 in this paper. However, once the more reliable PPML estimator is employed, the selection bias appears to matter only for FTAs and not CUs, and the overall selection bias is found to be positive for FTAs. Thus, the PPML results are consistent with a situation where the amount of positive selection into CUs is almost completely o¤set by an equal amount of negative selection. However, for FTAs, the negative selection e¤ect is weaker resulting in a net positive selection bias. The greater negative selection into CUs is plausible because it is a typically assumed to be a more integrated trade regime and thus would be lead to greater welfare gains in the presence of strong unobservables hindering bilateral trade (such as domestic shipping regulations). In light of such selection issues, it is essential to use both panel …xed e¤ects and the PPML in order to draw reliable conclusions. Table 6 reexamines the …ndings in Table 4 by using the same lag and lead speci…cations, but after splitting the sample. While columns (a), (b), (c) and (d) report results using data from 1960 to 1985, results in (e), (f), (g) and (h) correspond to the years 1990 to 2000. The split addresses any tension between the time dimension of the data and the assumption of time-invariant unobservables. Accordingly, the results in Table 6 are less sensitive to the possibility of crucial unobservables varying over time. 15 The results further strengthen the …ndings in Table 4 For both samples in Table 6 , individual and joint tests continue to reject the equality of the coe¢ cients on the trade agreement dummies, and on their lag and lead terms. This …nding for the 1990 to 2000 sample is especially interesting when compared to the cross-section test of equality results. Although cross-section results from the OLS speci…cation suggest signi…cant di¤erences in the FTA and CU coe¢ cients after 1970, the Table 3 results suggest the same, but upto 1970.
Panel Results After Splitting the Sample
However, once crucial unobservables are also controlled for, FTA and CU members are found to engage in signi…cantly di¤erent volumes of bilateral trade, in more recent times as well. FTAs for the 1960 to 1985 period might be attributed to the greater initial success of these CUs. It might also be the case that more recent CUs which entered into force around 1990, were initially not as successful in promoting trade and hence reduced the average CU e¤ect. 17 The OLS results in Table 7 also …nd CUs to promote more bilateral trade than above FTAs.
Panel Results After Controlling for EU
According to Krueger (1999, p. 106) , upto the late 1970s, the EU "was by far the most successful customs union."Hence, whether the EU's success is primarily responsible for this paper's …ndings, remains a relevant concern. Tables 8 and 9 aim to address this issue by considering a separate dummy variable for the EU. In other words, the EU variable takes the value one for a pair of EU countries, and zero otherwise. The CU dummy is assigned a value of one only to country pairs belonging to CUs other than the EU. However, the FTA variable remains unchanged. Given the previous …ndings, only the PPML method using the panel …xed e¤ects method is relied on. Lags and leads, characteristic of the other panel tables, are also included. While Table 8 utilizes the entire sample, Table 9 considers a split similar to the one in Table 6 .
The results are striking. Across all speci…cations using the full sample (Table 8) concluding that it is actually a CU which is responsible for this.
In general, members of a CU are found to engage in signi…cantly greater volumes of bilateral trade than FTA members. Strikingly, the …nding remains unaltered on controlling for a separate EU e¤ect, or on splitting the sample. Although some of the initial success of CUs can be attributed to the EU, the latter's prominence disappears in more recent years. 19 It is interesting to note that the di¤erence between the OLS and PPML estimates are more stark for the crosssection data used here. A possible explanation for this is the fact that panel data control for the time-invariant component of the error term and thereby control a potential source of heteroskedasticity in the PPML speci…cation. Notes: The results pertain to analyses similar to that in Table 4 Notes: See Table 8 . Tests of equality for each pair of trade agreement dummies, as in Table 8 , were conducted for both splits of the sample. In each case, the null of equality for each individual and joint test is rejected at the 1% level. The cumulative effects are obtained by adding the significant contemporaneous, lag and lead coefficients.
